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THE COMMON LAW PROCESS: A NEW LOOK AT AN
ANCIENT VALUE DELIVERY SYSTEM
Dennis J. Sweeney*
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with [others], have had a good deal
more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which [all] should be
governed.'

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article is prompted by the Access to Justice Technology Bill of
Rights (ATJ-TBoR) project.2 Part of the charge to the ATJ-TBoR
Committee is to
[d]evelop and implement an Access to Justice Technology Bill
of Rights ("ATJ-TBoR") premised on relevant principles
contained in the United States and Washington State
Constitutions, the mission and underlying principles and
declarations generating the creation and operation of the Access
to Justice Board, the principles contained in the Hallmarks of an
Effective Statewide Civil Legal Services Delivery System
adopted by the Access to Justice Board in 1995, and subsequent
and effectuating documents and declarations.3
One important aspect of this project is the application of the
principles generated by this effort to the societal disputes they are
intended to influence. Put another way, once we develop these
principles, what do we do with them? One goal the ATJ-TBoR project
must address is the practical problem of moving the lofty notions
. Judge, Division III of the Washington State Court of Appeals. I thank Judge Donald Horowitz,
the Chairperson of the ATJ-TBoR Committee, for allowing me to be a small part of this interesting
and important project.
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Little, Brown & Co. 1945) (1881)
(edited for gender neutrality).
2. Washington State Access to Justice Technology Principles (popularly referred to as the Access
to Justice Technology Bill of Rights (ATJ-TBoR)) (Dec. 2, 2003), available at
http://www.atjtechbillofrights.org, reprinted in 79 WASH. L. REV. 5 (2004).
3. Access to Justice Technology
Bill of Rights,
http://www.atjtechbillofrights.org (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
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generated from the thinking and formulation stage to the practical arena
of everyday conflict resolution.
I am a common law judge.4 I serve on a common law court in
Washington state. So I spend my days in the realm of what is: real
people with real controversies come to the court for the answers to real
questions.5 Common law appellate courts answer the questions presented
resolve the dispute, and,
through the vehicle of a written opinion,
6
law.
make
process,
the
in
incidentally
And it is in this sense that common law courts become a delivery
system-a delivery system for society's values. These values in some
fashion embody the customs of the community, the society, the courts,
and the legal community. As with any set of broad principles, such as
those found in constitutions or other basic laws, the ATJ-TBoR
principles do not come alive and have no meaning until they are applied
to a societal dispute-an actual case or controversy. No one can
anticipate all the questions, all the nuances that real people with real
conflicts will bring to their application. Until then, they remain largely
an abstraction.
It is, therefore, somewhat incongruous for a common law judge like
me to participate in a project to develop a set of principles to influence
future, and as yet, hypothetical disputes. That conflict came crashing in
on me as I struggled to collect my thoughts for this Article. Here, I
participate in a project to construct and then promote a set of principles,
all without the benefit of a case that has been prepared and argued. The
courts of this state have had and will have almost nothing to say about
the development of these principles-not, at least, in any traditional
common law sense. And so it may be appropriate for me to express some
ambivalence about the ATJ-TBoR project, or at least my involvement in
it. That said, I want to address technology, societal values expressed as

4. See R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE LAW 3 (D.E.L.

Johnston trans., 1992) ("[T]he common-law system differs fundamentally from the continental
system."). The common law is generated by the courts and traces its origins to the royal courts of
England beginning in the twelfth century. Id.
5. See R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 88 (2d ed. 1988) (noting
that the common law depends on precedent and is empirical). And, I would add, common law is
essentially inductive while continental law tends to be more theoretical and deductive, and based
more on abstract principles.
6. EVA H. HANKS ET AL., ELEMENTS OF LAW 4 (1994) ("Unlike statutes and constitutions, the

common law rests on no authoritative text external to the judiciary. The law is knowable only by
reading past 'cases'; it is not to be found anywhere other than in those very cases (and in
nonauthoritative summaries of them).").
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"rights," and common law courts and processes as a vehicle for
transforming values into rights.
The ATJ-TBoR is the product of a group of smart people periodically
gathering around a table for a few years and developing what we think
are good ideas-based maybe on some custom, legal lore, constitutional
values, or case law. Indeed, the history of both common and civil law is
a history rich in its diverse sources.7 But, whatever the source of these
principles, the implicit notion is that they are good ideas and should,
therefore, be law. In fact, the implicit argument in this project is that the
ideas embodied by these principles are so important that they should
assume the status of guiding principles for integrating technology into
the many facets of modem conflict resolution. Surprisingly, no one
questions this approach to the development of broad legal principles.
Have common law courts subtly and incrementally put themselves out
of the substantial and traditional business of law-making or, at least, put
themselves out of business as we once knew it? More personally, do I
belong here? Or am I helping to betray the common law tradition I
preach and practice and which has served the citizens of Washington
since statehood and before?
The short answer is: I think not.
Each of the relevant principles, if they are to have any practical
application at all, must someday be applied by a court to an actual case,
to an actual controversy. I suggest in this Article that regardless of the
form these principles ultimately assume-court rule, legislation, or
uniform code-it will be through common law courts and common law
processes that they ultimately become part of the fabric of our legal
culture. Only when a trial judge in King, Clark, or Benton County,
Washington, treats them as law and applies them as law in the process of
deciding a case will they become "law."
The essence of the common law tradition is a process for resolving
societal disputes-a process that generates law as a byproduct. 8 The
process does not set out to make law. Its goal is to resolve a particular
societal dispute in some principled and structured way. But, in doing so,
every decision becomes part of the fabric of "the law." Every decision

7. See VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 4, at 2 ("Historically, the major elements of the law belong to

a common European inheritance: ancient and medieval Roman law, canon law, old Germanic law,
feudal law, medieval municipal law, the natural law of early modem times.").
8. See Windust v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 52 Wash. 2d 33, 35-36, 323 P.2d 241, 243 (1958).
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by a common law court innervates and gives meaning to what otherwise
would be just a lifeless paragraph in a dusty book. 9
II.

TECHNOLOGY AND COMMON LAW COURTS

The common law develops slowly and uncertainly. If no case is
brought, no rule is developed. And the common law is conservative. It
always looks to what has been done before.' 0 But technology is neither
slow nor conservative. The potential for technology to influence the
courts, and the need for the law to accommodate this change, are not
unanticipated:
As we look ahead we may reasonably expect great changes in
the law, both statutory and decisional, in a number of areas.
Illustrative changes include a continued effort to improve the
quality of life .... Related problems involve ...increasing
demand by many members of the public for greater participation
in the benefits of our improving technology. 1
But who could have predicted the speed with which technology would
influence the entire spectrum of the law 12 -- legal policy,' 3 trial tactics

9. See DANIEL J. MEADOR ET AL., APPELLATE COURTS: STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES,
AND PERSONNEL 235 (1994).
10. See Windust, 52 Wash. 2d at 36, 323 P.2d at 243 (noting that "common law is comprised of
that body of court decisions in the nonstatutory field to which the doctrine of stare decisis applies").
But see State v. McCollum, 17 Wash. 2d 85, 107, 136 P.2d 165, 174 (1943) (noting that where
personal liberty is at stake, stare decisis will not save a prior holding "so patently erroneous that it is
hardly necessary to discuss it").
11. 2 WASH. STATE BAR ASS'N, WASHINGTON APPELLATE PRACTICE DESKBOOK 36-15 (1993).
12. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D.Mass. 1990)
(concluding that a menu command structure of a computer program, including the choice of
command terms, the structure and order of those terms, their presentation on the screen, and the
long prompts could be protected by copyright law); State v. Townsend, 105 Wash. App. 622, 630,
20 P.3d 1027, 1032 (2001) (stating that use of ICQ computer communications program results in
consent to recording by the recipient as a matter of law because of the characteristics of the
software), aff'd, 147 Wash. 2d 666, 57 P.3d 255 (2002).
13. See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, in COMPUTERS, ETHICS & SOCIAL
VALUES 332 (Deborah G. Johnson & Helen Nissenbaum eds., 1995); see also Dean Colby,
Conceptualizingthe "DigitalDivide ": Closing the "Gap" by Creatinga Postmodern Network That
Distributes the Productive Power of Speech, 6 COMM. L. & POL'Y 123, 163 (2001). Colby argues
that the mere passive access to modem communication technology is not enough: "[t]he linchpin for
any solution to the DD [digital divide] must include a judicial review of the First Amendment that
will yield case law that allows the government to protect speech by requiring private enterprise to
provide access to the means of speech." Id.

Common Law Process
and legal procedure,' 4 and the courts themselves' 5-all of which have
the potential to influence access to justice? The16 analogy of law as the
tortoise and technology as the hare is an apt one.
So the need to import values into the judicial process for application
to everyday conflicts generated or complicated by technology was
apparent. And part of the problem is access. Should the poor, the
disadvantaged, be assured access to the courts on an equal footing with
the well-to-do members of our society? If they should, then in what way
should they participate? And if the inexorable advance of technology can
serve either to impede or advance access to the courts, then what can the
courts do to ensure that technology does not impede but does in fact
advance access?

14. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 5, 43(a); Richard Zorza, Re-Conceptualizing the Relationship
Between Legal Ethics and Technological Innovation in Legal Practice: From Threat to
Opportunity, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2659, 2659-63 (1999) ("For the first time since the invention of
the typewriter and the telephone, technology has again begun to exert a significant influence upon
the practice of law. New communications technologies hold the promise of increased access to legal
services for the public at large, and particularly for the poor. The tide of innovation has, however,
triggered disquiet among experts in legal ethics, particularly in response to the practice innovations
that incorporate these technologies."); see also Marc A. Ellenbrogen, Note, Lights, Camera, Action.
Computer-AnimatedEvidence Gets Its Day in Court, 34 B.C. L. REV. 1087, 1087-90 (1993).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Munn, 507 F.2d 563, 567 (10th Cir. 1974) (defendant hearing
portion of trial through broadcast system); United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 1974)
(special phone system connecting defense counsel with defendant's cell), vacated on other grounds,
421 U.S. 944 (1975); State v. Gillam, 629 N.W.2d 440, 451 (Minn. 2001) (giving defendant option
of using room with interactive video capabilities); State v. Koontz, 145 Wash. 2d 650, 657, 41 P.3d
475, 479 (2002) (requiring protection against undue emphasis when video testimony is replayed for
deliberating jurors); Wallace v. Kuehner, Ill Wash. App. 809, 823, 46 P.3d 823, 831 (2002)
(determining that service by facsimile is not approved by Civil Rule 69 (Offer of Judgment)); State
v. Syrotchen, 61 Wash. App. 261, 265, 810 P.2d 64, 66 (1991) (videotaping an arraignment);
Fredric 1. Lederer, The Road to the Virtual Courtroom? A Consideration of Today's-and
Tomorrow's-High-Technology Courtrooms, 50 S.C. L. REV. 799, 808-12 (1999); Gerald R.
Williams et al., JurorPerceptions of Trial Testimony as a Function of the Method of Presentation:
A Comparison of Live, Color Video, Black and White Video, Audio, and TranscriptPresentations,
1975 BYU L. REV. 375, 410-12 (1978) (noting differences in juror response to live and videotaped
testimony).
Unequal access to technology may exacerbate the potential mismatch between an affluent client's
technology-savvy counsel and the poor or pro se litigant's pedestrian procedures. Lederer, supra, at
832. But courtroom technology is expanding access for the disabled. For example, real-time
transcription and closed captioning allow hearing-impaired people to be jurors, trial counsel, and
even judges. Id. at 834.
16. See Wash. Indep. Tel. Ass'n v. Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm'n, 149 Wash. 2d 17, 20, 65
P.3d 319, 320 (2003) (stating that "'the tortoise of federal law finally caught up with the hare of
communications technology' (quoting Michael I. Meyerson, Ideas of the Marketplace: A Guide to
the 1996 TelecommunicationsAct, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 251, 252 (1997))).
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Society changes, culture changes, and as this Symposium and, indeed,
the whole ATJ-TBoR project assumes, technology will drive or at least
influence that change. But if access to justice is to be a reality, regardless
of the inexorable march of technology, 17 then where will the guiding
principles come from? For those of us participating in the ATJ-TBoR
project, the answers are to be found in the principles generated by this
project. The introduction of this basic set of tools is necessary if the
courts are to cope with the impact of technology and its ramifications on
the justice system.' 8 It is then the goal of the ATJ-TBoR Committee to
provide that framework.
A.

EstablishedRights and New Technology

Describing the ATJ-TBoR as the development of a list of rights is a
bit misleading. Many of the rights in jeopardy, or at least at issue, are
well developed and, indeed, already drive courts' decisions.
Both Washington and United States courts have long and wellestablished precedents supporting fundamental rights, such as the right
to privacy,' 9 the right to travel, 20 and the right to a fair trial. 21 The
17. "It is not technology, as such, which affects society for good or bad, but its uses, which
are ... shaped by the values of society and by the historical context in which the technology is
used .... We must remember that we are not trapped helplessly in front of an unstoppable
technological steamroller. Our control is in how we use our knowledge that we will be required
to live with the results of our decisions on the use of this new technology."
Peninsula Counseling Ctr. v. Rahm, 105 Wash. 2d 929, 948, 719 P.2d 926, 936 (1986) (quoting
Fred W. Weingarten, Privacy: A TerminalIdea, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 18, 56 (1982)).
18. And, indeed, at least one recently adopted court rule accommodating the use of briefs on CDROM appears to be based squarely on the right proposed by Principle Number I of the ATJ-TBoR
"Requirement of Access to Justice." Proposed Principle Number I would require that
"[i]ntroduction of technology or changes in the use of technology must not reduce access or
participation and, whenever possible, shall advance such access and participation." See ATJ-TBoR,
supra note 2. Washington Rules of Appellate Procedure permit the submission of a brief on CDROM.
WASH.
R.
APP.
P.
10.9,
available
at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/court-rules/?fa=court-rules.display&group=app&set=RAP&ruleid=appr
apl0.09. But the rule does not require such a format. Id. 10.9(d). Nor does the rule allow the
imposition of the costs incurred in the preparation of those briefs. Id. 10.9(f).
19. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-86 (1965) (recognizing a right to privacy and
also noting that although the First Amendment does not specifically mention the freedom of people
to associate, to choose their children's schools, or choose a particular subject of study, these rights
have been construed to fall within the First Amendment); State v. Jackson, 150 Wash. 2d 251, 25960, 76 P.3d 217, 222 (2003) (recognizing a broader privacy interest under article I, section 7 of the
Washington State Constitution than under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
20. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969); Sorenson v. City of Bellingham, 80
Wash. 2d 547, 553, 496 P.2d 512, 515 (1972); State v. McBride, 74 Wash. App. 460, 465, 873 P.2d
589, 593 (1994) ("However, both the right to move about freely and the right to travel are protected
by our constitution."); Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 340 n.7, 487 P.2d 211, 215 n.7 (1971).
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challenge to the ATJ-TBoR Committee was to craft a set of principles
that will at least safeguard those rights as technology advances. So this
exercise of crafting a technology bill of rights entails protecting or, in
some cases, revisiting well-established rights such as privacy.
The fundamental right to privacy is well established independently of
any consideration of technology. 22 But sophisticated technologies have
affected the problem of privacy and, necessarily, the way privacy issues
are perceived by the courts. 2 3 The ATJ-TBoR principles assure that
existing and emerging technologies do not undermine this and other
already well-established rights.
The courts have already had to grapple with the influence of
technology on privacy in a variety of contexts. By statute in Washington,
it is unlawful to record any
[p]rivate communication transmitted by telephone, telegraph,
more
two
or
between
device
other
or
radio,
individuals... [using] any device electronic or otherwise
designed to record and/or transmit said communication
regardless how such device is powered or actuated, without first
obtaining the 24consent of all the participants in the
communication.
In three cases consolidated as State v. McKinney, 25 each defendant
was arrested after police officers accessed information contained in their
Department of Licensing (DOL) driver's license records. Each moved
21. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984); State v. Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d 254,
260, 906 P.2d 325, 328 (1995) ("The Washington Constitution provides at minimum the same
protection of a defendant's fair trial rights as the Sixth Amendment."); In re Richard, 75 Wash. 2d
208, 212-13, 449 P.2d 809, 812 (1969).
22. O'Hartigan v. Dep't of Pers., 118 Wash. 2d 111, 117, 821 P.2d 44, 47 (1991) (evaluating
right to privacy in the context of marriage and family); State v. Farmer, 116 Wash. 2d 414, 429-31,
805 P.2d 200, 208-09 (1991) (applying right to privacy to HIV testing); State v. Koome, 84 Wash.
2d 901, 904, 530 P.2d 260, 263 (1975) (recognizing minors' right to privacy).
23. See, e.g., Jackson, 150 Wash. 2d at 264, 76 P.3d at 224 (holding that police installation of
Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device on murder suspect's vehicle infringes upon
Washington state constitutional right to privacy and therefore requires a search warrant); State v.
McKinney, 148 Wash. 2d 20, 32, 60 P.3d 46, 51 (2002) (evaluating right to privacy in the context of
Department of Licensing records); State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 186, 867 P.2d 593, 599
(1994) (holding that warrantless thermal imaging to detect heat sources within home is a violation
of right to privacy); State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 63, 720 P.2d 808, 813 (1986) (holding that
police was not permitted to learn who a person was contacting by tracking her phone calls); State v.
Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 511, 688 P.2d 151, 154 (1984) (holding that warrantless aerial
surveillance violates state privacy clause).
24. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030(l)(a) (2002).
25. 148 Wash. 2d 20, 60 P.3d 46 (2002).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 79:251, 2004

for dismissal or suppression on the ground that the search of DOL
databases prior to arrest violated the privacy provisions of the state
constitution. Their motions were denied, and the defendants were
convicted. The court held that access to a computer database to confirm
license plate numbers is not an invasion of the vehicle owner's right to
privacy:
Based on the historical treatment of driver's license records, the
fact that these records reveal little about a person's associations,
financial dealings, or movements, and the purpose for which the
State compiles and maintains these records, we hold that there is
no protected privacy interest in the information contained in a
DOL driver's record under article I, section 7 of our state
constitution. 26
Likewise, the release of the names of public employees, without
more, has been held not to be a violation of privacy, even if that
information could be linked to other computer-generated information
about the employee. 27 An essential argument in both McKinney and
Tacoma Public Library v. Woessner,28 was that technology-the
computer-with its capacity to collate information easily and quickly
should change the rules for disclosure of information (licensing
information in McKinney, and personal information in Woessner) given
the statutory and constitutional right to privacy in Washington. The
courts rejected arguments for nondisclosure simply because computers
changed the ease and accuracy with which this information could be
associated or accessed.2 9
30
But evidence obtained in violation of Washington's privacy statute
is inadmissible in a criminal case. 31 The Washington State Supreme
26. Id. at 32, 60 P.3d at 52.
27. King County v. Sheehan, 114 Wash. App. 325, 346, 57 P.3d 307, 317-18 (2002) ("It is a fact

of modem life in this age of technology that names can be used to obtain other personal information
from various sources, but we conclude that this is not sufficient to prevent disclosure of the names
of police officers under the act."); Tacoma Pub. Library v. Woessner, 90 Wash. App. 205, 218, 951
P.2d 357, 363 (1998) (involving release of names of library employees).
28. 90 Wash. App. 205, 951 P.2d 357 (1998).
29. McKinney, 148 Wash. 2d at 30-31, 60 P.3d at 51; Woessner, 90 Wash. App. at 218, 951 P.2d
at 363. But see State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 181-82, 867 P.2d 593, 597 (1994) ("The right of

privacy under Const. art. 1, § 7 is 'not confined to the subjective privacy expectations of modem
citizens who, due to well publicized advances in surveillance technology, are learning to expect
diminished privacy in many aspects of their lives."' (quoting State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506,
511,688 P.2d 151, 154 (1984))).

30. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.050 (2002).
31. Id.
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Court concluded that under Washington's privacy act, e-mail messages
to a fictitious minor to arrange for an illegal sexual liaison were private
and hence inadmissible because the communications in real time by way
of the ICQ instant messenger program were intended to be private and
were recorded on a device (the sting officer's computer).32
Similarly, in State v. Nordlund,33 the appellate court noted with
approval the trial court's characterization of the "personal computer as
'the modem day repository of a man's records, reflections, and
conversations"' and thereby conferred Fourth Amendment protection to
the exercise of a First Amendment right.34
Suits or defenses based on privacy are nothing new-and, indeed,
may be on the increase as a byproduct of advancing technology. The
object here is to provide the courts with principles that assure that
technology, and the advance of technology, do not erode fundamental
rights, like privacy.
B.

Implied Rights

I will make another point on the topic of rights and common law
courts. I have selected rights that are, at least constitutionally, implied. I
will explore this more fully in my review of Washington case law
supporting access to justice. But my point here is that it was necessary
for the courts to imply these rights in order to give effect to other express
and accepted rights.
To take a few other examples: The right to vote-how do I participate
in democratic government if my right to vote is restricted? The right to
work-how do I work (particularly in this modem economy) if I cannot
travel? The right of access-how do I assert any right or vindicate any
right for others if I am denied access to the courts because of poverty?
And, finally for purposes of the ATJ-TBoR, how do I participate in any
dispute resolution process when I neither have access to nor understand
the dizzying array of technology that is fast becoming a part of the
system?

32. State v. Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d 666, 673-77, 57 P.3d 255, 259-61 (2002).
33. 113 Wash. App. 171, 53 P.3d 520 (2002), review denied, 149 Wash. 2d 1005, 70 P.3d 964
(2003).
34. Id. at 181-82, 53 P.3d at 525 (quoting trial court record).
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COMMON LAW

I turn now to a few observations about the operation of a modem
common law system, or at least, the operation of the common law
system in Washington state.
A.

Common Law Reasoning

The courts of this state exercise their authority through legal
reasoning. They do not provide a technique for supplying the right
answers. 35 Indeed, in this pluralistic society, the "right answer" is
frequently the subject of some debate. So "ultimate results are often less
important than how they are arrived at.",36 In fact, "[t]he most important
'reception' from England was perhaps not any particular body of
doctrine but a way of thinking about law which made it easier for our
great jurists (such as Story) to create an indigenous American
jurisprudence., 37 What the courts do, instead, is choose between
competing arguments and then, through the vehicle of a written opinion,
justify that choice.
And the court's analysis can always be distilled into a logical
syllogism. 38 The major premise is the statement of the law-the rule:
running a red light is negligent; obtaining money by lying is fraud. The
minor premises are the particular facts of a case: the defendant ran the
red light; the defendant lied to obtain money. And, finally, the
conclusion: the defendant ran the red light and was, therefore, negligent.
Or the defendant lied to obtain money and was, therefore, guilty of
fraud.39
In modem common law analysis, the major premise-the rulefrequently originates outside of the judicial system. The ATJ-TBoR was
not generated by our common law court system. And that may well be in
keeping with the modem common law approach to the development of
law. So then, where do these rules come from?

35. See LIEF H. CARTER, REASON IN THE LAW 12 (4th ed. 1994).

36. Robert S. Summers, ProfessorFuller's Jurisprudenceand America's Dominant Philosophy
of Law, 92 HARV. L. REV. 433, 448 (1978).
37. HANKS, supranote 6, at 7.
38. Perhaps the most familiar of all syllogisms: All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; Socrates is
therefore mortal.
39. RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 124-27 (1990).

Common Law Process
B.

The Major Premise (the Rule) and Its Sources

"What is it that I do when I decide a case? To what sources of
information do I appeal for guidance? In what proportions do I permit
them to contribute to the result? In what proportions ought they to
contribute?"' 4
Any common law resolution of a case begins with the identification
of some principle-some rule of law. And a variety of sources contribute
to those rules. It is not usually a judge-made rule that adds the major
premise to the syllogistic proposition 41 that ultimately resolves the case.
Sources include state and federal constitutions, state and federal
legislation, learned treatises, law reviews, and restatements of the law.
But all have a common attribute. They have been identified by some
court as worthy of application to a societal dispute. In traditional
common law, the rule with which the court started reflected the custom,
or at least the court's understanding of the custom of the realm. Indeed,
the common law system has been described as the "custom of following
custom.

'42

And, at least during one period of the long common law

tradition, the rules articulated by the judges were, if not God's law, at
least a reflection of the laws of nature.4 3
We have, of course, abandoned any notion of judges speaking eternal
truths in favor of a more rational, utilitarian approach to values, at least
those that we are willing to apply to societal disputes. But, that said, the
grounding of common law values in natural law endowed the system
with the aura of doing the "right thing"; some sense of the absolute;
something beyond the here and now and the "just us." This notion seems
to have been accepted when our state constitution was adopted. a And I
think it finds expression in Washington's access to justice cases.
40. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10 (1921).
41. See ALDISERT, supranote 39, at 28.
42. CARTER, supra note 35, at 121-22.
43. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 42 (1983); CARTER,
supra note 35, at 123-24; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 12 (1990); M.
Stuart Madden, The Vital Common Law: Its Role in a Statutory Age, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J.

555, 572 (1996) ("The origins of the common law can be traced at least from Aristotle and Cicero
through the Book of Exodus. It is generally supposed that much of the animating basis for early
common law derived from an innate, elemental, and sometimes theocratic concept of justice often
termed 'natural law."').
44. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 32 (requiring "[a] frequent recurrence to fundamental principles
[as] essential to the security of individual right and the perpetuity of free government"); ROBERT F.
UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION, A REFERENCE GUIDE 44
(2002).
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That aside, the major premise, the black letter rule, of a court's
syllogistic exercise is frequently supplied by sources outside of the court
system.4 5 Of course, in a democratic and remarkably populist state (by
constitutional declaration of rights, all political power resides in the
people),46 much of our public policy is outside the province of the
courts. The usual source is the legislature. We now have extensive codes
for everything from commerce, 47 to crime
and sentencing, 49 to
probate, 50 and marital dissolution.5 1 Uniform laws fill almost every nook
and cranny of areas previously reserved to the discretion of judges, the
courts, and case precedent.
But, regardless of the source of the general principle or major
premise, the black letter rule reflects the custom of the society. Or, at
least, it represents the ideal of what that custom should be. A common
law system is said to identify and apply the "customs" of the
community. 2 The sources used to identify those customs have changed
over the centuries. But the courts still work to identify principles that in
some sense continue to represent the customs of a community.
So one obvious and important source of rules for judges in this state is
the legislature. 3 But it is not the only source. In our modem common
law system there are many other sources of law. And each claims its
own authority to speak for the community. Each claims its own right to
say that this principle, this statement, this rule, is the custom in the
community or is generally acknowledged to be a good idea and should
be the custom in this community.
Some rules are articulated by the Washington State Supreme Court
acting in its rulemaking capacity. 54 Some are the product of a persuasive
45. CARTER, supra note 35, at 15.
46. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1.
47. Uniform Commercial Code, WASH. REV. CODE tit. 62A (2002).

48. Crimes and Punishments, WASH. REV. CODE tit. 9.
49. Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 9.94A.
50. Probate and Trust Law, WASH. REV. CODE tit. 11.
51. Dissolution of Marriage-Legal Separation, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.09 (containing detailed
legislative directions and standards for marital dissolution actions).
52. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 21 (2d ed. 1985).

53. See State v. Laitinen, 77 Wash. 2d 130, 133, 459 P.2d 789, 791 (1969) (stating that courts do
not consider whether a statute plain on its face is unwise or ineffectual, only whether it is within the
legislature's constitutional powers).
54. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.28.150 ("When jurisdiction is, by the Constitution of this state, or by
statute, conferred on a court or judicial officer all the means to carry it into effect are also given; and
in the exercise of the jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding is not specifically pointed out by
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law review or other learned treatises, in which the authors collect,
synthesize, and analyze what others have said about a topic.55 Some
rules are the product of restatement editors as they collect and organize
what courts have said about an issue. 56 And traditional common law
remains by legislative mandate a source of rules. 57 This is particularly so
with the contribution of the American Law Institute, which identifies
and distills common law rules and systematizes them in the process. 58
Even a cursory review of Washington cases shows that the sources of the
principles that control the outcome of societal disputes are many and
varied. Finally and specifically, the principles represented in the ATJTBoR are founded upon Washington's tradition of universal access to
justice.59 These are principles identified by a broad spectrum of lawyers,
judges, scholars, and citizens concerned with the poor, the courts, and
technology.60
The wells from which common law courts have drawn the customs of
the realm have changed over the years. But identification of these rules,
principles, and statements continues to represent an acknowledgement
by the courts that a rule, principle, or statement in some way represents
the demands of an ordered society. The law generated by appellate
judicial opinions should reflect the social, political, and economic
influences and ideas of our age.

statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most
conformable to the spirit of the laws."). The validity of a court rule need not stand solely on either
constitutional or statutory grounds. State v. Templeton, 148 Wash. 2d 193, 217, 59 P.3d 632, 644
(2002) ("A nexus between the rule and the court's rule-making authority over procedural matters
validates the court rule, despite possible discrepancies between the rule and legislation or the
constitution.").
55. See Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, 116 Wash. App. 886, 893, 68 P.3d 1130, 1133 (2003)
("'Bennett has been criticized. The Corbin treatise concludes it is wrong. A law review article
makes an extensive analysis in disapproving of the rationale and possible broad holding."' (quoting
Nevue v. Close, 123 Wash. 2d 253, 256, 867 P.2d 635, 636 (1994))).
56. FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 676.

57. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.04.010 ("Extent to which common law prevails. The common law, so
far as it is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, or of the state of
Washington nor incompatible with the institutions and condition of society in this state, shall be the
rule of decision in all the courts of this state.").
58. FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 676.
59. See infra Part IV.
60. See supraPart I.
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Case law is the wide stream flowing uninterrupted since the twelfth
century.6 ' Principles like those set out in constitutions or statutes or
those represented in the proposed ATJ-TBoR are, then, the levees,
embankments, and even the dams that structure and direct the resolution
of that stream of disputes.
The ultimate expression of law by the courts may not always be clear,
clean, or even well organized, but that reflects the reality of human
conflict. That reality is driven home when one asks: How will the ATJTBoR influence a specific divorce action? A criminal prosecution? A
complex commercial case? Without the context of a specific case, the
answer is unknown and unknowable. It may be educated speculation, but
speculation nonetheless.
Through the work of the ATJ-TBoR Committee, an important new
source of legal principles has been added to those a Washington judge
can draw upon. And, ultimately, the speed at which these principles
work their way into the common law of Washington may not depend
upon the vehicle used to implement them-legislation, Supreme Court
rule, uniform body of law, law review. It may instead turn on the work
of judges of this state, who, with the aid of trial and appellate lawyers,
identify them in traditional common law parlance as customs of the
community.
Let us now move from the major premise, the rule, to other steps in
the common law process of deciding cases.
C.

Common Law as Process

If we regard the common law as a mechanism for delivering the
values of a society at a given time, the common law courts are very
much alive. Indeed, they are an indispensable and vibrant dispenser of a
society's values. "'The common law is not a body of rules; it is a
method. It is the creation of law by the inductive process.',

62

It is courts

that first identify principles from a variety of sources and then apply
them by traditional processes based on the exigencies of a given case
and, in the process of doing so, make law.
The processes by which the lawsuit and law developed have remained
stable, even if the sources for the rules have changed and expanded over
61. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 4, at 3 (noting that the common law developed "from the twelfth
century" and is "characterized by historical continuity").
62. Madden, supra note 43, at 559 (quoting RICHARD A. COSGROVE, OUR LADY THE COMMON
LAW: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMUNITY 1870-1930, at 33 (1987) (citations omitted)).

Common Law Process

the centuries. Lawyers still bring a case-a question-to the courts. A
trial judge in some fashion decides the facts, with or without a jury.
Those facts become the minor premises in the syllogism that ultimately
dictates the result.
Whether the source is the constitution, a statute, or a prior judicial
decision, all rules must be applied before they become law.. In at least
one sense, then, the rules do not dictate the result. Indeed, in the
common law tradition, the function of rules is guidance. 63 Common law
processes allow the courts to tailor broad principles and general rules to
the demands of the particular case before the court. It is always the
general being applied to the particular. 64 "Thus, one possible answer to
our initial question ('what is law?') is that, at least in 'common law,' law
is application-applicationof legal norms by individuals in ordinary
65
interactions.,
Common law processes include, at a minimum, a case in controversy,
identification of a general principle, and application of that principle to
the specific case in controversy, employing canons of construction and
interpretation, standards of review, equity, juries, and a judge exercising
discretion at every stage of the process. Even if a case is not strictly
speaking one of first impression, the nuances of a specific fact pattern
will amplify or explain established precedent. Thus, a new statement of
the law results from the resolution of the case.
Even the selection of the rule requires an exercise in judgment, an
exercise in discretion by the court. Is the right at issue constitutional or
one conferred by statute or court rule? 66 If the rule is a constitutional
mandate, is it controlled by our Washington State Constitution or the
United States Constitution? 67 Does an administrative regulation supply

63. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 179 (1960).

64. See Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court Viewed from Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. REv. 635, 643 n.19 (1971) ("The justification for discretion is often the need for
individualized justice ..." (quoting KENNETH DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY 17 (1969))).

65. HANKS, supra note 6, at 4.
66. See, e.g., State v. Templeton, 148 Wash. 2d 193, 216-17, 59 P.3d 632, 643-44 (2002)
(evaluating juvenile's right to counsel); Sackett v. Santilli, 101 Wash. App. 128, 133, 5 P.3d 11,14
(2000) (noting that court rule may constitutionally supersede statute so as to permit waiver ofjury in
civil proceedings), afid, 146 Wash. 2d 498, 504,47 P.3d 948, 951 (2002).
67. See, e.g., State v. O'Neill, 148 Wash. 2d 564, 595, 62 P.3d 489, 506 (2003) (Chambers, J.,
concurring) (comparing article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution with Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution).
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the principle? 68 And if so, is it within the purview of the legislative
enabling act, and is it constitutional? 69 And even if the principle is
supplied by a statute, regulation, or constitution, do the elements meet
traditional common law requirements, say, to sustain a conviction for the
commission of the crime charged? 70 Classification of a question as
arising in equity or at law greatly influences the application of the
principle and the ultimate outcome.71
A general principle of law is a statement of values. But what does it
mean? How is it to be applied? In short, how does the principle find
expression and application to the societal disputes it is intended to
affect? It is here, as a mechanism by which evolving societal values are
transmitted and applied, that the essence of the common law system
endures. Values are transmitted by common law courts resolving
everyday societal disputes, both civil and criminal.
First and probably foremost, the standard of review determines the
degree of deference, if any, to be given to the trial court's interpretation
and application of the rule.72 Next, the principle may be filtered through
one or more canons of construction to determine the manner in which it
will be applied.73 Rules of evidence, whether incorporated into court
rules or established at common law, may also influence the outcome of a
given case.74 Outcomes are also affected by conscious and (as Justice
68. See, e.g., Hillis v. Dep't of Ecology, 131 Wash. 2d 373, 397-400, 932 P.2d 139, 151-53
(1997) (looking at policies for prioritizing water rights).
69. See, e.g., Wash. Indep. Tel. Ass'n v. Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm'n, 148 Wash. 2d 887,
901-02, 64 P.3d 606, 613-14 (2003).
70. See, e.g., State v. Marcum, 116 Wash. App. 526, 534, 66 P.3d 690, 694-95 (2003) (holding
that knowledge is an essential element of the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm, despite its
absence from the statute).
71. See, e.g., Green v. McAllister, 103 Wash. App. 452, 462, 14 P.3d 795, 801 (2000) (stating
that in granting remittitur, court failed to distinguish between equitable and legal issues).
72. See, e.g., In re Parentage of Jannot, 149 Wash. 2d 123, 126, 65 P.3d 664, 666 (2003) (stating
that child custody procedural rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion, not de novo, even if based on
affidavits); State v. Read, 147 Wash. 2d 238, 243, 53 P.3d 26, 30 (2002) (noting that standard of
review for refusal to instruct jury on self-defense depends on reason for refusal).
73. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order
of Eagles, 148 Wash. 2d 224, 274-76, 59 P.3d 655, 680-81 (2002) (Sanders, J., dissenting) (using
several canons in the application of anti-discrimination statute), cert. denied,__ U.S._, 123 S. Ct.
2221 (2003); City of Tacoma v. William Rogers Co., 148 Wash. 2d 169, 182, 60 P.3d 79, 86 (2002)
(Sanders, J., dissenting) (construing ambiguity in revenue-generating statutes most strongly against
government and in favor of citizen); State v. Keller, 143 Wash. 2d 267, 276-77, 19 P.3d 1030, 1035
(2001) (utilizing plain meaning rule in sentencing under three-strikes law).
74. A party who moves unsuccessfully to exclude the opponent's proposed evidence may offer
that same evidence without waiving his claim of error. See State v. Thang, 145 Wash. 2d 630, 647
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Holmes reminds us 75) unconscious factors the court brings to bear on the
particular dispute before it. Finally, such traditional common law
processes as harmless error 76 and appellate deference to judicial
discretion 77 give common law courts a significant role in bringing
general principles to bear on the outcome of a given case.
Besides that, all of this is filtered through minds trained in a specific
tradition:
The judge, even when [s]he is free, is still not wholly free. [S]he
is not to innovate at pleasure. [S]he is not a knight-errant
roaming at will in pursuit of his [or her] own ideal of beauty or
of goodness. [S]he is to draw his [or her] inspiration from
consecrated principles. [S]he is not to yield to spasmodic
sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. [S]he is to
exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by
analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to "the
primordial necessity of order in the social life."78
The common law is, then, a process of courts applying societal norms to
people in real life disputes. Judges exercise discretion at every stage of
the process.
A court finds the facts of a given controversy. It then decides which
of those facts are material and excludes others as immaterial. Only the
material facts are then permitted to influence the decision in a given
controversy. The court next identifies the legal principle to be applied to
that specific set of facts. And deciding that one legal principle controls

n.6, 41 P.3d 1159, 1168 n.6 (2002) (citing JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 18, at 836 (Peter Tillers ed., 1983)); State v. Ellis, 136 Wash. 2d 498, 521, 963
P.2d 843, 855 (1998) (applying decisional law rather than Rule of Evidence 702 to admissibility of
expert testimony in capital case).
75. See supra note 1.
76. See generally Dennis J. Sweeney, An Analysis of Harmless Error in Washington: A
PrincipledProcess, 31 GONZ. L. REV. 277, 278 (1995/96).
77. See State v. Karpenski, 94 Wash. App. 80, 101-06, 971 P.2d 553, 564-67 (1999).
To identify the nature of the trial court's discretion is not, of course, to identify the nature of
our own discretion on appeal. When a trial judge's function is to decide whether the evidence
is sufficient to support a finding, a reviewing court's function will be the same. When a trial
judge's function is to decide whether the evidence preponderates, a reviewing court's function
may or may not be the same. If the reviewing court's information is as good or better than the
trial court's, the reviewing court will sometimes be permitted to substitute its own view,
without deference to the trial court; but if the reviewing court's information is not as good as
the trial court's, the reviewing court will limit itself to deciding whether the evidence is
sufficient to support what the trial court did.
Id. at 104, 971 P.2d at 566 (footnotes omitted).
78. CARDOZO, supra note 40, at 141 (edited for gender neutrality and footnote omitted).
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over another is an exercise in judgment by the court. Many dissents are
generated by disagreement over the dispositive rule. 79 The court then, of
course, applies these principles to the facts. 80
Finally, juries remain an important part of our legal tradition. Their
application of a given rule to a specific controversy is nothing less than a
reflection of the customs of a society. An intricate, nicely worded jury
instruction setting out the rule to be applied may provide a trial lawyer
some fodder for appeal. But, once the jury retires to deliberate, it is free
to ascribe to the words whatever meaning it chooses. 8'
Rumors of the demise of the common law may be premature. 82 Codes,
rules, and statutes do not apply themselves. Rather, it is the common law
process of making law by arriving at principled decisions in real cases,
based not upon a single rule or statute, but upon a whole tradition of
looking at and thinking about law and legal problems that both yields a
decision and incrementally adds to the body of common law. The
common law approach remains the single most effective mechanism for
adapting the law incrementally to society's changing values. Witness the
way in which the law has accommodated dramatic changes in our
economic structure and practices, 8 3 or the incorporation of the ongoing
scientific advances in DNA evidence.8 4 And, of course, the common law
approach retains the ability to tailor law to the needs of the individual
case.

79. See, e.g., State v. Fire, 145 Wash. 2d 152, 175, 34 P.3d 1218, 1229-30 (2001) (Sanders, J.,
dissenting); State v. Valentine, 132 Wash. 2d 1, 28, 935 P.2d 1294, 1307-08 (1997) (Sanders, J.,
dissenting); Griffin v. Eller, 130 Wash. 2d 58, 75, 922 P.2d 788, 795-96 (1996) (Talmadge, J.,
dissenting); State v. Ray, 116 Wash. 2d 531, 556, 806 P.2d 1220, 1233 (1991) (Dolliver, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part); State v. Crenshaw, 98 Wash. 2d 789, 813, 659 P.2d 488,
501-02 (1983) (Dore, J., dissenting).
80. See MEADOR, supra note 9, at 235-36.
81. Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Prods. Co., 117 Wash. 2d 747, 769, 818 P.2d 1337, 1348
(1991); Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wash. 2d 516, 532, 554 P.2d 1041, 1051 (1976); Gardner v.
Malone, 60 Wash. 2d 836, 841, 376 P.2d 651, 654 (1962); Chiappetta v. Bahr, 11I Wash. App. 536,
541, 46 P.3d 797, 800 ("Accordingly, evidence that a juror misunderstood or failed to follow the
court's instructions inheres in the verdict and may not be considered."), review denied, 147 Wash.
2d 1018, 56 P.3d 991 (2002); State v. Hatley, 41 Wash. App. 789, 794, 706 P.2d 1083, 1086-87
(1985).
82. Madden, supra note 43, at 555 n.2.
83. Kinkade v. Witherop, 29 Wash. 10, 19, 69 P. 399, 402 (1902); Madden, supra note 43, at
609-10.
84. See State v. Gore, 143 Wash. 2d 288,303-04, 21 P.3d 262, 271 (2001).

Common Law Process
With these reflections on the common law in the twenty-first century
here in Washington, let me now turn to Washington's evolution of the
notion of access to justice and examine some of these processes at work.
IV.

WASHINGTON'S ACCESS TO JUSTICE

A bedrock foundation for the ATJ-TBoR project and, indeed, for the
whole concept of access to justice, is the notion that all citizens of this
state have a basic right to access justice. But this principle will not be
found in any state or federal constitution,85 or in any statute, book, or
rule.86 The principle of access to justice will only be found in a short list
of Washington State Supreme Court cases beginning with O'Connor v.
Matzdorf in 1969 and ending with Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Center88
in 1991.
I will focus on two aspects of each case: first, the underlying principle
supporting the concept of access to justice in this state; second, and just
as importantly for this Article, the source of authority from which the
court derives the principle underlying access to justice-the well from
which the court drew its inspiration, if not the rule.
A.

O'Connor v. Matzdorff

Glennie O'Connor tried to file a lawsuit in Yakima Justice Court for
replevin and damages of $215.50. State statute required payment of a
filing fee. Ms. O'Connor filed a motion and affidavit to proceed informa
pauperis instead of paying the fee. 89 The court clerk refused to accept

85. See Carter v. Univ. of Wash., 85 Wash. 2d 391, 397-98, 536 P.2d 618, 622-23 (1975) ("In
weighing the nature of a right, it is clear that the fact that it is not specifically mentioned in the
constitution is not dispositive. For instance, both the right to travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969), and the right to privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), are both fundamental rights under the Constitution of the United States
although nowhere specifically so mentioned."), overruled in part by Hous. Auth. v. Saylors, 87
Wash. 2d 732, 557 P.2d 321 (1976).
86. But see Saylors, 87 Wash. 2d at 739, 557 P.2d at 325 (questioning the existence of any such
right, or at least its foundation); Filan v. Martin, 38 Wash. App. 91, 97, 684 P.2d 769, 772-73
(1984) (in response to the assertion of a constitutional right to access, the court notes that "It]he
[N]inth [A]mendment to the United States Constitution ensures only those rights deemed
fundamental by history and tradition. It does not necessarily give constitutional magnitude to all
unenumerated rights. The same analysis applies to the Tenth Amendment.") (citations omitted).
87. 76 Wash. 2d 589, 458 P.2d 154 (1969).
88. 117 Wash. 2d 772, 819 P.2d 370 (1991).
89. O'Connor, 76 Wash. 2d at 590, 458 P.2d at 154-55.
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the filing. Ms. O'Connor petitioned the Washington State Supreme
the clerk to accept and file her
Court for a writ of mandamus requiring
90
fee.
a
of
payment
without
papers
The first question the court addressed was whether to assume original
jurisdiction and hear the case at all. 91 Holding that the question of
whether Ms. O'Connor was entitled to proceed with her suit despite92her
poverty was "fundamental," the court agreed to decide this question.
The court based its holding that the right to sue, despite indigence,
was fundamental on a series of law review articles and a book. 93 A
preliminary proposition established was that, at least, the question of
fundamental.94 The right is then accepted as
poverty as a bar to suit is 95
fundamental in a later case.
The next question was whether or not Ms. O'Connor was indigent as
a matter of law.96 The court concluded that, given the size of her family
and that her sole income was a public assistance grant, she was
indigent. 97 This legal conclusion was based on authority of a Social
Security Administration definition of poverty, an editorial in the Seattle
Post-Intelligencer, and a law review article.9 8 The court then expanded
and clarified the legal definition of poverty based on an earlier
90. Id. at 590-91, 458 P.2d at 155.
91. Id. at 591-92, 458 P.2d at 155.
92. Id. at 592, 458 P.2d at 155-56.
93. Although only an individual's right is being asserted in this proceeding, the question to be
decided involves very deeply the interests of the public and in particular those of a regrettably
large segment of our society. The right of the poor to obtain redress for wrongs, and to defend
themselves when sued by the more affluent, is presently of nationwide concern, as is evidenced
by the attention given to the subject in legal periodicals. Some notable discussions are to be
found in the following: Samore, Legal Services for the Poor, 32 ALBANY L. REV. 509 (Spring
1968); Shriver, Law Reform and the Poor, 17 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (Dec. 1967); Stumpf, Law and
Poverty: A Political Perspective, 3 Wis. L. REV. 694 (1968); Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs
andAppointment of Counselfor Poor Persons in Civil Cases, 2 VALPARAISO U. L. REV. 21 (Fall
1967); Barvick, Legal Services and the Rural Poor, 15 KAN. L. REV. 537 (1967). The leading
article was written years ago by John MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36
HARV. L. REV. 361 (Feb. 1923), reviewing the history of the relations between poor people and
the courts and lamenting the slowness of the movement toward justice for the indigent. See also a
book by J. COMER, FORGING THE FEDERAL INDIGENT CODE (1966).
Id. at 592-93, 458 P.2d at 156.
94. Id. at 592, 458 P.2d at 155.
95. Carter v. Univ. of Wash., 85 Wash. 2d 391, 398, 536 P.2d 618, 623 (1975) ("Accordingly, we
consider access to the courts to be a fundamental right."), overruled in part by Hous. Auth. v.
Saylors, 87 Wash. 2d 732, 557 P.2d 321 (1976).

96. O'Connor,76 Wash. 2d at 593, 458 P.2d at 156.
97. Id. at 593-94, 458 P.2d at 156-57.
98. Id. The law review article was William Samore, Legal Services for the Poor, 32 ALBANY L.
REV. 509(1968).
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Washington State Supreme Court decision 99 and a United States
Supreme Court decision:' 00
We held that the term does not and cannot, in keeping with the
concept of equal justice to every man, mean absolute destitution
or total insolvency. Rather it connotes a state of impoverishment
or lack of resources on the part of the defendant which, when
realistically viewed in the light of everyday practicalities,
substantially and effectively impairs or prevents his pursuit of
his remedy. 1 1
The next question in the analysis was "has the court the inherent
power to waive fees prescribed by statute"?10 2 In dicta, the court
observed that if a court had created the rule requiring the filing fee, a
court could waive it. But the fee here was required by legislative
enactment. The court ultimately held that it has "inherent power" to
waive the fee, notwithstanding the statute.' 0 3 The source for this
remarkable holding is important. The court quoted extensively from an
American Law Report, which in turn relied on ancient treatises (Britton:
Views on Disseisin; Mirrour of Justices); English case law; English
statutes (from the reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII); and
miscellaneous state and federal cases.' 0 4 The court also concluded that
justice courts have the same inherent power because "[t]he justice courts
of this state do exercise a portion of the common law jurisdiction."' 5
The final question was whether the court "should exercise the power
to waive its fees in a given case."'' 0 6 And the answer to that question
turned on the validity of the argument that the poor, unchecked by
prohibitive filing fees, would "inundate the courts with frivolous
cases."' 1 7 And, again, the authority for the court's conclusion that the
concern was unwarranted
included two law review articles, one of which
10 8
cited a legal periodical.

99. State v. Rutherford, 63 Wash. 2d 949, 389 P.2d 895 (1964).
100. Adkins v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948).
101. O'Connor,76 Wash. 2d at 594, 458 P.2d at 156-57.
102. Id. at 597, 458 P.2d at 158 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 600, 458 P.2d at 160.
104. Id. at 598-600, 458 P.2d at 159-60.
105. Id.at 604,458 P.2d at 162.
106. Id. at 600, 458 P.2d at 160.
107. Id. at 601, 458 P.2d at 160.
108. Id. at 602, 458 P.2d at 161-62.
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With O 'Connor,access to justice became a reality in Washington. In
sum, the court decided: (1) the right of an indigent citizen to sue is
fundamental and significant; (2) "indigent" does not necessarily mean
"utterly destitute" or "totally insolvent"; and (3) courts have inherent
authority to waive a filing fee imposed by the legislature.
Another interesting and significant aspect of this case is the court's
approach to identifying and supporting the principles announced. It is
classic common law. What is the custom of the community on these
questions? The answer, if O'Connor is any guide, is that it is what
lawyers, commentators, and judges are saying and have said it is and the
court's own sense of the felt necessities of the times. 109
B.

Iverson v. Marine Bancorporation
10
In Iverson v. Marine Bancorporation,'
Lil Iverson recovered a

$1000 judgment following a wrongful eviction action. She did not think
it was enough, so she tried to appeal.11 Following some procedural
wrangling, the Washington State Supreme Court remanded to the trial
court for findings of fact on those questions required by the O'Connor
decision. A trial court then found (1) Ms. Iverson did not have the
money to perfect and prosecute an appeal, and (2) her appeal was
12
prosecuted in good faith and was not frivolous.'
With that factual backdrop, the question framed for the court was
whether the Washington State Constitution obligated the court to accept
the appeal without cost."'
The court began its analysis with article IV, sections 1 and 30 of the
Washington State Constitution. 1 4 These provisions vest all judicial

109. See CARDOZO, supra note 40, at 141.
110. 83 Wash. 2d 163, 517 P.2d 197 (1973).
111. Id. at 164,517 P.2dat 197.
112. Id. at 166, 517 P.2d at 198-99.
113. Id. at 166-67, 517 P.2d at 199 ("[Amicus] argue that the state constitution sets up both the
Court of Appeals and this court to handle a particular mission. That mission, they argue, is for the
courts to hear and decide all cases regardless of whether the parties are rich or poor; that they be
accessible to all citizens; and that they resolve individual and social conflicts regardless of whether
the parties are rich or poor. We agree.").
114. Id. at 167, 517 P.2d at 199; see also WASH. CONST. art. IV, § I ("Judicial Power, Where
Vested. The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, superior courts, justices
of the peace, and such inferior courts as the legislature may provide."); id. art. IV, § 30 ("Court of
Appeals. (1) Authorization. In addition to the courts authorized in section 1 of this article, judicial
power is vested in a court of appeals, which shall be established by statute.").
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power in the courts of this state. 115 Then, based on authority of
O'Connor, the court proceeded from that constitutional grant of power
to examine the "duties" imposed by that authority.1 16 This step was
significant, because what followed is not spelled out in the constitution
(state or federal) or in any statute. It is court-made law, based on the way
the deciding court and past courts (including the O'Connor court)
defined their duties:
These duties include, among others, the fair and impartial
administration of justice and the duty to see that justice is done
in the cases that come before the court. The administration of
justice demands that the doors of the judicial system be open to
the indigent as well as to those who can afford to pay the costs
of pursuing judicial relief.
In the O'Connorcase we stated...:
Were this court to hold that the Supreme Court has the
power to waive prepayment of costs and that the superior
court has a like power, but that no such power exists in
justice courts, an anachronism would result. This would be
tantamount to a holding that, if a poor person has a large
claim, the courts will open their doors to him; but if his
claim is small, those doors must be closed, simply because
there were no justice courts at common law....
The proper and impartial administration of justice requires
that these doors be kept open to the poor17as well as to those
who can afford to pay the statutory fees.'
The court concluded from all of this that it had the constitutional duty to
allow Lil Iverson to prosecute her appeal without cost.'18
Now, the important dimension that Iverson adds to the access to
justice struggle is the constitutional dimension. But it does so in a
characteristically common law way. The state constitution says simply
that judicial power is vested in the courts. But what does the court do? It
decides what that judicial power entails. And it does so by looking at
what it said in the past on the same question-what it said in O'Connor.
The court then adds another important constitutional justification for the
notion of access to justice-that the courts are a separate branch of
115. Iverson, 83 Wash. 2d at 167, 517 P.2d at 199.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 167-68, 517 P.2d at 199.
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government-the branch vested with judicial power. And, more
importantly, the court then defines its obligations to the poor: "The
administration of justice demands that the doors of the judicial system be
open to the indigent as well as to those who can afford to pay the costs
of pursuing judicial relief.""19
After Iverson, access to justice is now firmly rooted in a state
constitutional grant of authority to the courts and the common law of this
state.
C.

Carter v. University of Washington

In Carter v. University of Washington,120 the University of
Washington fired Sidney Carter because he violated regulations (which
ones and how are unstated). He appealed to the Higher Education
Personnel Board and later to the superior court. Both affirmed his
dismissal. He then tried to appeal to the Washington State Supreme
Court without paying a filing fee or posting a bond.' 2' It was this failure
to pay the filing fee that stimulated the court's discussion in this case.
Only three justices signed the lead opinion, which reached out most
expansively for authority to support the notion of access to the courts.
First, the lead opinion stated that the idea of access to justice has been
around for a long time, maybe even two millennia: "Universal access to
the courts is certainly not a novel concept in the annals of jurisprudence.
Access to the courts was prized and protected by the Romans over 2,300
years ago.' 22
Next, the lead opinion remarked that the problem of access had been
noted, but movement
toward easier access to the courts had been "less
23
than impressive": 1

119. Id. at 167,517 P.2dat 199.
120. 85 Wash. 2d 391, 536 P.2d 618 (1975), overruled in part by Hous. Auth. v. Saylors, 87
Wash. 2d 732, 557 P.2d 321 (1976).

121. Id. at 392, 536 P.2d at 620.
122. Id. at 393, 536 P.2d at 620 (citing John MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36
HARV. L. REV. 361 (1923)). A number of other law review articles are used to bolster this claim:
For further comparative studies, see Ginsberg, The Availability of Legal Services to Poor
People and People of Limited Means in Foreign Systems, 6 INT. LAW. 128 (1971); Cappelletti,
Fundamental Guarantees of the Parties in Civil Litigation: Comparative Constitutional,

International, and Social Trends, 25 STAN. L. REV. 651 (1973); Cappelletti & Gordley, Legal
Aid. Modern Themes and Variations, 24 STAN. L. REV. 347 (1972).
Id. at 393 n.2, 536 P.2d at 620 n.2.
123. Id. at 393, 536 P.2d at 620.
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Fifty years ago, in 1924-[19]25, the American Bar Association's
Committee on Legal Aid Work drafted a model Poor Litigant's
Statute which provided, inter alia, that a poor litigant would be
excused from giving security for costs and from payment of any
fees. But the ABA's model statute apparently has had only
nominal influence
in most jurisdictions in the development of
1 24
poverty law.

Additionally, the lead opinion noted that the courts serve as society's
"complaint desk." 125 And in that capacity, the courts implement part of
the social contract between society and individual citizens. Judicial
resolution of private and public grievances promotes peace and avoids
violent resolution of those disputes.272 6 Again, authority for this comes
from a series of law review articles.'
The lead opinion also stated that public policy alone cannot be the
basis for access to the courts (why it cannot be the basis of a judicial
decision is left unstated) and, specifically, waiver of fees and costs on
appeal. The opinion turned, therefore, to more structured sources of
common law doctrine-case precedent and the state constitution.' 28 It
relied on O'Connor and Iverson for the conclusion that the courts have
the inherent power to waive costs. The conclusion was bolstered by
citation to a series of California cases and a law review article. 129 It then
turned to the Washington State Constitution. It is in this part of the
opinion that two additional justices joined for a five-to-four majority.
The constitutional argument supporting the opinion came in steps.
First, the court argued that access to the courts is a prerequisite to every
other right-there are no rights if there is no right to enforce any right.
124. Id. (citing generally Lee Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counselfor
PoorPersons in Civil Cases, 2 VAL. U. L. REV. 21 (1967)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 393-94, 536 P.2d at 620-21.
127. Id. at 394, 536 P.2d at 621 ("See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CIVIL DISORDERS 5 (1968); Note, Boddie v. Connecticut: Free Access to Civil Courts For
Indigents, 76 DICK. L. REV. 749 (1972). See also Abrams, Access to the Judicial Process, 6 GA. L.
REV. 247 (1972).").
128. Id. at 394-96, 536 P.2d at 621-22.
129. Id. at 395, 536 P.2d at 621 ("Several California decisions are in accord. See, e.g., Ferguson
v. Keays, 4 Cal. 3d 649, 484 P.2d 70, 94 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1971) (appellate filing fee); Roberts v.
Superior Court, 264 Cal. App. 2d 235, 70 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1968) (appellate cost bond); Bank of Am.
Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Superior Court, 255 Cal. App. 2d 575, 63 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1967) (nonresident plaintiff's cost bond); Note, California's Civil Appeal in Forma Pauperis-An Inherent
Power of the Courts, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 683 (1972). Cf In re Karren, 280 Minn. 377, 159 N.W.2d
402 (1968).").
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The right of access must, therefore, be implied, like the right to travel
and the right to vote. 130 The concurring justices agreed only on those
arguments grounded in the actual wording of two provisions of the
Washington State Constitution: 3 ' article I, section 4 (the right to
1,section 12 (requirement of equality of privileges
petition) 3 2 and article
33
and immunities). 1

Second, the Carter decision held, based on the right to petition, "that
the explicit provision in our constitution preserving the right to petition
and, indeed, makes fundamental the right of
for grievances encompasses
134
access to the courts."'
The Carter decision next grounded the right to access in
Washington's privileges and immunities clause. Before launching into
this last bit of constitutional analysis, the court reached out for one more
bit of custom to justify the use of the state constitution-Washington's
populist tradition. Its source3 for this bit of cultural information, which
soon became law, is history.1 1
And finally, the court reasoned that only a compelling state interest
would justify denying indigent citizens access to the courts under the
state privileges and immunities clause. The interest advanced by the
state was the deterrence of frivolous lawsuits and controlling work load.
But the court, relying yet again on a series of law review articles,
was constitutionally too broad, given other
concluded that this interest
36
available safeguards. 1

At the end of the day, the only grounds for a right of access to justice
that five justices could agree on were state constitutional grounds-the
right to petition the government (article I, section 4) and the guarantee of
equal privileges and immunities (article I, section 12).137 And, while the
130. Id. at 397-98, 536 P.2d at 622-23.
131. Id. at 403, 536 P.2d at 625.

132. "The right of petition and of the people peaceably to assemble for the common good shall
never be abridged." WASH.CONST. art. I, § 4.
133. "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than
municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all
citizens, or corporations." Id. art. I, § 12.
134. Carter,85 Wash. 2d at 399, 536 P.2d at 623.
135. Id., 536 P.2d at 623-24 ("Indeed, Washington is well noted for its populist tradition. See
generally M.W. AVERY, HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 199-216
(1961). Against this backdrop of our Washington Constitution, classifications based upon wealth are
indeed dubious.").
136. Id. at 400-01, 536 P.2d at 624.
concurring).
137. Id. at 403, 536 P.2d at 625-26 (Utter, J.,
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most interesting and far reaching sources of authority are set out in the
lead opinion, it is not the majority opinion. Only the Washington State
Constitution provides the basis for the majority
holding-a holding
38
partially undone in HousingAuthority v. Saylors.1
D.

Housing Authority v. Saylors

The King County Housing Authority evicted Frances Saylors from
her home for maintaining a "nuisance." An administrative tribunal,
composed of fellow tenants, affirmed the action, as did a superior court
judge in the Housing Authority's unlawful detainer action. Ms. Saylors,
armed with the court's decision in Carter, marched up to the
Washington State Supreme Court and asked for 1public
funds to
40
139
prosecute her appeal. The court rejected her petition.

The rationale of the Saylors decision is straightforward. The court
interpreted the Washington State Constitution's privileges and
immunities clause (article I, section 12) similarly to the way in which
federal courts have interpreted the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.14' The United States Supreme Court, in
construing the Fourteenth Amendment, does not require waiver of court
fees for indigents when the right at stake is not a fundamental one and
"there is another procedure available, not requiring the payment of fees,
through which redress can be sought." 142 Therefore, the court held, since
litigation in the field of economics and social welfare does not involve a
suspect class, no special scrutiny is required. 143
So, after Saylors, indigent civil litigants are back to relying on
O'Connor and Iverson. To repeat the essential instructions of those
cases: The courts have inherent power to waive fees and costs in civil
appeals based on tradition and the constitutionally vested inherent
authority of the courts if (1) the indigent litigant makes a showing of

138. 87 Wash. 2d 732, 557 P.2d 321 (1976).
139. Id. at 733-34, 557 P.2d at 322-23.
140. Id. at 744, 557 P.2d at 328.
141. Id. at 738-39, 557 P.2d at 325.
142. Id. at 739, 557 P.2d at 325.
143. Id. at 739-40, 557 P.2d at 325-26. On the question of whether poverty should be a suspect
class, see Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and ConstitutionalLaw, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277,
1279 (1993), stating the obvious that the poor do not fully participate in the democratic processes
and therefore democratic legislation disfavoring them should be reviewed with more scrutiny than
simple rational basis.
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poverty, (2) justice requires, and (3) the appeal is not frivolous and is
prosecuted in good faith.
The dissent in Saylors reiterates the constitutional principles laid
down in Iverson, Carter,and O'Connor.First, the Washington State
Constitution (article IV, sections 1 and 30) vests the courts of this state
with the power to administer justice (a principle not challenged by the
majority): "'These duties include, among others, the fair and impartial
administration of justice and the duty to see that justice is done in the
cases that come before the court."' "44 Second, "'[t]he administration of
justice demands that the doors of the judicial system be open to the
indigent as well as to those who can afford to pay the costs of pursuing
judicial relief."",145 Third, the right to petition for redress of grievances,
pursuant to article I, section 4, is not limited to cases involving political
grievances. The court should "construe article I, section 4, so as to give
full effect to its broad language and purpose to the end that both the poor
and the affluent may be heard by government."'' 46 Finally, article I,
section 12, of the state constitution must be interpreted differently than
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. When
47
properly applied, this provision is more protective of individual rights.
Recently, the constitutional rationale of Saylors (reliance on the
United States Supreme Court's view of the Fourteenth Amendment's
privileges and immunities clause) has been eroded by the decision in
4
Grant County Fire Protection District No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake.' 1
There, residents challenged the Washington state statutory scheme that
permitted the petition method (by landowners) rather than an election
method (by residents of the area to be annexed) as a means of annexing
property to a city. Under the petition method, the petition can be based
upon ownership of the majority of property in an area to be annexed

144. Saylors, 87 Wash. 2d at 744, 557 P.2d at 328 (Horowitz, J., concurring in result only)
(quoting Iverson v. Marine Bancorporation, 83 Wash. 2d 163, 167, 517 P.2d 197, 199 (1973)). This

common law notion is all that remains as support for access to justice at the end of Saylors.
145. Id. at 744-45, 557 P.2d at 328 (Horowitz, J., concurring in result only) (quoting Iverson, 83
Wash. 2d at 167, 517 P.2d at 199).
146. Id. at 755-56, 557 P.2d at 334 (Horowitz, J.,
concurring in result only).
147. Id. at 756-57, 557 P.2d at 335 (Horowitz, J., concurring in result only).
148. 145 Wash. 2d 702, 42 P.3d 394 (2002), rev'd on reh 'g, _ Wash. 2d _,__

P.3d _ (2004)

("And, although in recent cases this court has held that the privileges and immunities clause is
substantially similar to the equal protection clause, Seeley v. State, 132 Wn. 2d 776, 788, 940 P.2d
604 (1997), the possibility that article 1,section 12 could be analyzed separately from the federal
equal protection clause has been left open.").
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rather than upon an equal vote by those residing in the area. 149 The court
engaged in a State v. Gunwall 5 ° analysis 151 and held:
[T]he Gunwall factors weigh in favor of a determination that
article I, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution
provides greaterprotection than the equal protection clause of
the United States Constitution when the threat is not of
majoritarian tyranny but of a special benefit to a minority and
52
when the issue concerns favoritism rather than discrimination. 1
The important point of Grant County for the access to justice community
is that analysis of our own state's privileges and immunities clause is not
tied to federal Supreme Court Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.
The constitutional support for access laid out in Carterand the dissent in
Saylors, therefore, remains viable.
It is certainly true, as the Saylors decision notes, that democraticallyelected legislators are appropriately vested with authority to legislate in
the area of social and economic welfare. But it is also true that access to
the court to redress grievances cannot be limited by either economics or
social status. That remains a 15constitutional
matter, the resolution of
3
which is reserved to the courts.
E.

Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Center

Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Center is the last in this series of access to
justice cases. I will first make a few observations about this decision.
First, the author for this eight-judge majority also signed the Saylors
opinion, which, as I have noted, unraveled some of the constitutional
underpinning for access to justice. 54 Next, the access issue was ancillary
to the main question-whether the trial court abused its discretion by
requiring production, subject to restrictions, of the name of a blood
donor. The court nonetheless launched into a discussion of access and, in
doing so, criticized the analysis of the Saylors decision.
149. Id. at 709-12, 42 P.3d at 397-99.
150. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
151. In Gunwall, the court settled upon six nonexclusive criteria to determine whether the
Washington State Constitution extended broader rights to its citizens than the United States
Constitution and should therefore apply, incidentally relying on a number of law review articles in
the process. Id. at 59-61, 720 P.2d at 811-12.
152. Grant County, 145 Wash. 2d at 731, 42 P.3d at 408 (emphasis added).
153. Iverson v. Marine Bancorporation, 83 Wash. 2d 163, 167, 517 P.2d 197, 199 (1973).
154. Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 117 Wash. 2d 772, 781-82, 819 P.2d 370, 375-76 (1991)
(Brachtenbach, J).
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Doe alleged that he contracted AIDS from a blood donation. He sued
the Puget Sound Blood Center (Blood Center). Doe later died-the suit
alleged as the result of AIDS-and the superior court substituted his
estate as party plaintiff. The estate moved for an order requiring the
Blood Center to disclose the identity of the donor of the infected blood.
The Blood Center refused. The court exercised its discretion and
required production of the identity subject to restrictions. 55 The
Washington State Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the court's
exercise of discretion. 56 In doing so, however, it placed the discovery
question in the broader context of access. In that broader context, the
court made a number of noteworthy comments about access in general,
and the Saylors decision in particular. First, the court observed that
"[o]ur cases on the right of access are somewhat perplexing."'' 57 Next,
the court quoted from the Iverson discussion of access to justice: '" [t]he
administration of justice demands that the doors of the judicial system be
open to the indigent as well as to those who can afford to pay the costs
of pursuing judicial relief,' and '[c]onsistent with our affirmative duty to
keep the doors of justice open to all with what appears to be a
plaintiff is entitled
meritorious claim for judicial relief, we hold that 'the
58
to the relief requested [waiver of fees and costs].""

Commenting on the Saylors court's rejection of the Carter court's
grounding of the right of access in sections 4 (right to petition) and 12
(privileges and immunities) of article I of the Washington State
Constitution, the court noted: "The Saylors court held that reliance upon
the cited constitutional provisions was in error. However, the important
point in Saylors is the statement that '[a]ccessto the courts is amply and
expressly protectedby otherprovisions.'Unfortunately, the court did not
explore the rationale for its conclusion."' 5 9
Finally the court returned to a rationale expressed in O'Connor,
Carter,and Iverson: "The right of access is necessarily accompanied by
those rights accorded litigants by statute, court rule or the inherent
powers of the court, for example, service of process, [Revised Code of

155. Id. at 775-76, 819 P.2d at 372-73.

156. Id. at 776, 819 P.2d at 372.
157. Id. at 781,819 P.2d at 375.
158. Id., 819 P.2d at 375 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Iverson, 83 Wash. 2d at 167-68, 517 P.2d

at 199).
159. Id. at 781-82, 819 P.2d at 375 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Hous. Auth. v.
Saylors, 87 Wash. 2d 732, 742, 557 P.2d 321, 327 (1976)).
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Washington] 4.28, or statutes of limitation."' 60 The court rejected as
inadequate the Blood Center's submissions in support of nondisclosure:
"The Blood Center and allied amici attempt to support these contentions
with materials ranging from a quote from Newsweek Magazine to a
quote from the Secretary of State of Scotland to testimony before a
congressional subcommittee."' 161 Among the court's reasons for rejecting
those submissions was the absence of a factual basis, either lay or
162
expert.
V.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN WASHINGTON-IN SUM

By way of summarizing this tour of Washington access to justice
cases:
1. The right of an indigent person to sue is fundamental and
significant.
2. Indigence does not mean complete destitution or total
insolvency.
3. The authority for the courts to accommodate the petitions of
indigent civil litigants is well grounded in English common law
and English legislative enactments, both of which are part of our
own common law.
4. "The right of access is necessarily accompanied by those rights
accorded litigants by statute, court rule or the inherent powers of
the court, for example,
service of process, RCW 4.28, or statutes
63
of limitation.",
5. The Washington State Constitution vests judicial power in the
164
courts
whereby the courts have assumed certain duties. These
duties include
the "fair and impartial administration of
165
justice."'
6. The further constitutional grounding of access to justice in, at
least, the privileges and immunities clause of article I, section
12, is still an open question.
7. And all of this is so because a common law court, relying on a
variety of traditional and present day sources, has said so. Any
160. Id. at 782, 819 P.2d at 375.
161. Id. at 786, 819 P.2d at 377.
162. Id. at 786-87, 819 P.2d at 377-78.
163. Id. at 782, 819 P.2d at 375.
164. WASH. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 30.
165. Iverson v. Marine Bancorporation, 83 Wash. 2d 163, 167, 517 P.2d 197, 199 (1973).
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accommodation to the poor through the implementation of the
ATJ-TBoR principles is necessarily premised on the recognition
of a fundamental right of access to justice. And that right is the
product of common law judges' application of traditional
common law processes to the resolution of individual cases.
A final thought: Unrestricted access by the poor to our legal system
for the resolution of their disputes is important in one other way. It has
implications for the development of law. Common law courts articulate
and bring to life the values of a society. They do so in the form of legal
principles-principles developed in case law. Every single appellate
case, then, adds to the body of law. If our guiding principles are truly to
reflect the full range of the values of our society, and not just a narrow
segment of it, all members of the community must have at least the
opportunity to influence their development. So, to the extent that the
poor are denied access to the courts, the principles articulated by the
courts will not reflect the general customs and traditions of this state.
Two basic questions repeatedly crop up in the judicial debate over
access to justice. First, is it a good idea? This is a question posed by
those who tend toward the more economic model of justice and rights.
Their concern is that easy access simply opens up the floodgates of
litigation, including lots of frivolous lawsuits that economic constraints
now hold in check. 166 In this view, access is a public policy and,
therefore, solely a legislative concern.167 The second recurrent question
is, if it is a good idea, then is it required to be implemented, or at least
accommodated, by our state constitution? Of course, if access to justice
is constitutionally required, then the first question goes away. It makes
no difference whether access to justice is a good idea.
These ATJ-TBoR principles reflect economic, philosophical, and
moral judgment; they all sound like a good idea: that is, as a purely
rational proposition, as simply a matter of scholarly deduction. Their
justification will be developed on a case-by-case basis by the courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
The proposed principles memorialized in the ATJ-TBoR fit into our
modern common law system. It is impossible to divine the ultimate
effect of every new technology on every rule, practice, or procedure. But

166. See O'Connor v. Matzdorff, 76 Wash. 2d 589, 600-01,458 P.2d 154, 160 (1969).
167. See Hous. Auth. v. Saylors, 87 Wash. 2d 732, 740-41, 557 P.2d 321, 326 (1976).
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what we can do in the common law tradition is promulgate a set of
principles that public rulemaking bodies-the legislature, the courts, the
American Law Institute-can use so as to avoid the possibility, indeed
the probability, that technology will reduce or inhibit68the enjoyment of a
fundamental right-the right of access to the courts.
The best that any rulemaking body can do is craft a set of general
principles. Those principles will then influence the exercise of discretion
in the courts in a way that improves access to the courts in spite of and,
we hope, because of technology. The specifics, then, for implementing
this general set of principles for a technology bill of rights are best left to
judges, passing upon individual cases brought about by particular
controversies that come before the court.
By advancing the common law system, I do not suggest that we turn
back the clock to the days when common law judges were regarded as
oracles. 169 I look instead to the ways in which a common law system
functions in this state at this moment in our history. The judicial
approach to legislation is an imperfect, but helpful, parallel. The court
70
reads legislation so as to effect the purpose of the legislative body.1
Likewise, other rules are applied by the courts on a case-by-case basis to
effect their articulated purpose-rules of evidence, rules of practice and
procedure, and statutory enactments affecting the processing and filing
of litigation. 171

The modem common law judge usually works with rules promulgated
by someone else-the legislature, administrative agencies, state supreme
courts in their rulemaking capacity, or uniform law committees. But

168. One concern, for example, is e-filing of court documents by proprietary systems (such as
West or Lexis) upon which users will become as dependent for electronically filed documents much
as they presently are for judicial opinions. See, e.g., Wendy R. Liebowitz, Courts Electrify Suits,
Sparks Fly; New Rules Needed for E-filings, NAT'L LAW J., Sept. 7, 1998, at B6, cited in Dale A.
Whitman, Digital Recording of Real Estate Conveyances, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 227, 268
(1999). Off-line members of the public will need assistance to access electronic court files. Lederer,
supra note 15, at 804-05.
169. See BLACKSTONE, supranote 43, at 69.
170. See Cockle v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 142 Wash. 2d 801, 807, 16 P.3d 583, 585-86 (2001)
("The primary goal of statutory construction is to carry out legislative intent."); State v. Fjermestad,
114 Wash. 2d 828, 837, 791 P.2d 897, 902 (1990) (Guy, J., dissenting) ("Under general principles
of statutory construction, when construing a statute the court's purpose is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the Legislature.").
171. See, e.g., State v. Hubbard, 106 Wash. App. 149, 153, 22 P.3d 296, 298 (2001) (court rule);
City of Spokane ex rel. Wastewater Mgmt. Dep't v. Dep't of Revenue, 104 Wash. App. 253, 260,
17 P.3d 1206, 1210 (2001) (administrative regulations), rev'd, 145 Wash. 2d 445, 38 P.3d 1010

(2002).
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whatever the source, it is the application of these rules that must reflect
the needs of a particular case, and it is that case that will be cited to by
future courts when the same or a similar question is presented. It is in
that way that law becomes "self-generating. '' 172 Another benefit of a
common law system is its ability to adapt to changing conditions 173 --"to

meet these new and unexpected conditions of society."'' 7 4 Witness the
changes in the law that accommodated the industrial revolution or the
current changes with the scientific advances in DNA.
The common law has the capacity to adapt to new technologies. Of
concern here is the way in which it adapts. Ultimately, judges must sit
and reason to the notion that all of our fellow men and women should
have equal access to these courts. That is what we have tried to do with
the ATJ-TBoR.
Is it perfect? Of course, it is not. But it is a start. It provides the judges
of this state with the ability to craft rulings that at a minimum do not
impede access to the justice system and perhaps may enhance the access
of the poor to the system. Judges must reconcile often inconsistent and
contradictory values.17 5 Adoption of the ATJ-TBoR in some form is in
keeping with a long tradition of not only access to the courts by the poor
but also liberal resort to extrajudicial sources for principles to effect such
rights. These principles should, by a process of accretion, become a part
of the common law here in Washington. As such, they will be part of a
principled approach to adapting
to the state's changing social, cultural,
176
and political conditions.

172. See HANKS, supranote 6, at 4.
173. Madden, supra note 43, at 593.
174. William B. Homblower. A Century of "'Judge-Made"Law, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 453, 453
(1907).
175. See Charles Horowitz, Legal Justice, Values and Appellate Decision-Making, 18 GONZ. L.
REV. 633, 642 (1982/83).
176. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 13 (1982).

